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Abstract
Three separate credential systems, namely Secret Handshakes (SH), Oblivious Signature-
Based Envelopes (OSBE) and Hidden Credentials, have been introduced in recent years.
These credential systems are very useful in anonymous communication as they have
an interesting common feature which is the ability to combine encryption with access
control. This feature allows participants to protect their credentials from being dis-
closed while running the protocols, which makes these credential systems a natural fit
for privacy-preserving and anonymity-oriented applications.
Since these systems have many similarities, interest has arisen in converting them
from one to another. Consequently, a series of OSBE schemes based on ElGamal
family signatures was proposed, along with a generic construction of SH from OSBE.
According to this generic construction, any ElGamal family signature based OSBE
scheme can be converted to SH within three communication moves, with the exception
of the ElGamal and DSA signatures. To complement the previous result, we propose
two three-move SH schemes based on ElGamal and DSA signatures, respectively.
Furthermore, we consider the question of extending the two-party SH to a multi-
party setting. We observe that almost all of the SH schemes can be constructed from
particular key agreement schemes. Hence we implement an efficient ID-based Au-
thenticated Group Key Agreement (AGKA) scheme, from which we can construct a
multi-party SH scheme. Very recently, a new multi-party SH scheme has been proposed
based on an unauthenticated group key agreement scheme ahead of our implementa-
tion. However, we note that there exists a drawback in this scheme, which may cause
the leakage of a valid member’s group affiliation in a failed multi-party SH protocol.
Therefore, we propose a Group Secret Handshake (GSH) scheme that resists against
this attack, and prove that our scheme is secure.
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